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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN R. JENNER and MARJORIE
E. JENNER, his wife,
Plaintiffs/
Respondents,

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

REAL ESTATE SERVICES, a Utah )
corporation, JOSEPH C. FRANICH)
and CAROLYN M. FRANICH, his
)
wife~ and LARRY J. NIELSON
)
and KAY NIELSON, his wife,
)

CASE NO. 17048

)

Defendants,

)

~----------------------))
RONALD JOHNSON,
Intervenor/
Appellant.

)
)
)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - NATURE OF THE CASE

The Appellant brought a Motion to Intervene and a
Motion to Set Aside Plaintiffs'
upon

Plaintiffs'

Unlawful

Default Judgment granted

Detainer

action

to

obtain

possession of their real property after having exercised
their

forfeiture

rights

under

a

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract.
DISPOSTION IN THE LOWER COURT

The Third Judicial District Judge, Honorable G. Hal
Taylor, denied Appellant's Motion to Intervene and further
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denied Intervenor's Motion to Set Aside Plaintiffs' Default
Judgment.

Each Motion was denied without comment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The Appellant, Ronald Johnson, seeks the right to
intervene and enter a

defense

to

Plaintiffs'

Unlawful

Detainer action by a reversal of the Lower Court's denial of
his Motion to Intervene and Motion to Set Aside Plaintiffs'
Default Judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Plaintiff, Sellers, under a Uniform Real Estate
Contract in October 1978, elected to rescind said Contract
under Paragraph 16{a), because the Buyers (assignees of the
original Buyers) were three months delinquent in payments of
$7 49 per month.

Plaintiffs'

attempted to enforce said

rescission and forfeiture by an Unlawful Detainer action
filed August 19,

1981.

September 23, 1981.

Default Judgment was granted on

The Appellant was not named in nor had

any notice of the commencement of said lawsuit.
Appellant had a prior undisclosed interest in the
concerned real property per the March 27, 1979 agreement
with Joseph

c.

Franich,

one of

the named defendants.

subsequently, Appellant purchased all of the Defendants•,
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Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn M. Franich, interest (one-half
interest)

in the concerned real property by paying $5,000

cash and giving a $5,000 Note on September 15,
Quitclaim

Deed

was

recorded

evidencing that purchase.

on

September

15,

1981.

A

1981,

At no time did Defendant, Joseph

C. Franich, indicate to the Appellant that there were any
delinquencies or lawsuits with the concerned property, as
per Intervenor's Affidavit.
Appellant's interest was not known to Plaintiffs
prior to the commencement of their lawsuit and not of record
until the 15th day of September, 1981.
Appellant had no notice of the delinquencies,

the

Contract termination, nor the Unlawful Detainer action until
after

September

25,

1981.

Immediately

after

receiving

notice, Appellant offered to bring the Contract current and
pay all accruing court costs and attorney's fees, which the
Plaintiffs'

rejected.

Appellant

filed

his

Motions

to

intervene and set aside the Default Judgment on October 6,
1981.
Appellant's Motions to Intervene and to Set Aside
the Default Judgment were denied by the District Court Judge
at the hearing of October 14, 1981.
Intervenor tendered the sum of $6,500,

At that hearing the
(alleged by Plaintiff

attorney to be the total sum due and owing including all
costs and attorney's fees)

to reinstate the Contract.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.

INTERVENOR HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE
IN ANY LAWSUIT IN WHICH HIS INTEREST
MAY NOT BE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED OR
THE RULING ON WHICH WILL ADVERSELY
AFFECT THE DISPOSITION OF HIS PROPERTY
RIGHTS, EVEN THOUGH INTERVENOR (a)
ACQUIRES A PROPERTY RIGHT AFTER AN
ACTION IS COMMENCED, (b) HAS AN
UNDISCLOSED PROPERTY RIGHT WHEN THE
ACTION IS COMMENCED, or (c) IS A
JOINT VENTURER WITH A DEFENDANT.

Rule 24{a) (2) and (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure states as follows:
(a) Intervention of Right.
Upon timely
application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: ... (2) when the
representation of the Applicant's interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and
the Applicant is or may be bound by a judgment
in the action; or (3)
when the Applicant is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property
which is in the custody or subject to the
control or disposition of the court or an
officer thereof.
All persons claiming property rights from the named
Defendants in Plaintiffs'

lawsuit will have any property

rights which they hold adversely affected by said judgment.
Mr. Johnson, the Intervenor, claims rights to said property
through the Defendants,

Joseph C.

Franich and Carolyn M.

Franich, from two different transactions.

First, in order

of time but not importance, would be his contract right with
the Defendant, Joseph C. Franich, entered into on March 27,
1979, under which funds were placed with Mr. Franich so that
he could invest in real property.
-4-

These funds subsequently
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became part of the downpayment Mr. Franich used to purchase
the subject real property.

By the terms of the Contract,

the Appellant was the owner of one-half interest in the
subject real property.

Second,

Appellant purchased

from

Defendants, Joseph C. Franich and Carolyn M. Franich, all of
their right, title and interest in and to said real property
(specifically

the

other one-half

interest,

that Johnson

didn't already own) by paying the sum of $10,000 in the form
of a $5,000 Cashier's check and a Promissory Note for $5,000
on September 15, 1981.

If there was any objection to the

Intervenor having the right under Rule 24 to intervene, when
his only property interest was an undisclosed or dormant
partner's interest,

no question as to that right can be

raised after the September 15th purchase.
My review of Rule 24 in Utah law and in the cases
and treatises published on the subject, reveal no cases or
articles in point.

Commerce Block Realty Company v. United

States Fidelity & Guarantv Company, 83 Utah 414, 28 P2d 1081
(1934),

an

early

Utah

case

sets

the

standard

for

intervention which has carried over to today as follows:
The test usually applied to the right to
intervene is whether a person seeking to
intervene may gain or lose by a direct legal
operation and the effect of the judgment.
(Page 1083)
Appellant

will

undisclosed,

lose

all

property

rights

(whether

joint or direct and whether acquired before or

after the commencement of the suit),

-5-

if the

Plaintif~
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is

successful.

Certainly the Appellant in this case has the

right to intervene under the Commerce Block Realty test.
The

case

at

hand

also

presents

the

different

circumstance of requesting to intervene after a Default
This question was raised in

Judgment has been granted.

Martin v. Pickering, 85 Wash.2d 241, 533 P2d 380

(1975).

This case, although being decided against the Intervenor,
directs us to the type of reasoning we should consider as
follows:
In considering the question of timeliness,
all the circumstances should be considered,
including the matter of prior notice of the
lawsuit and the circumstances contributing
to the delay in moving to intervene. (Page 382)
The case further refers us to N.A.A.C.P. v. New York, 413
U. S .

345 ,

9 3 S . Ct • 2 5 91 ,

3 7 L . Ed •

2d 6 4 8

(1973 ) ;

and

Pellegrino v. Nesbit, 203 F.2d 463 (9th Cir.1953) as support
for their reasoning. Martin v. Pickering concerns a Motion
to

Intervene after

judgment.

The case concludes after

considering all the circumstances, the Intervenor's actual
notice from the beginning of the lawsuit and, in fact, its
earlier appearance and then withdrawal from the lawsuit, was
not sufficient to allow intervention after judgment.
Mr.

Johnson,

the Intervenor in our suit,

knowledge whatsoever of the

had no

lawsuit and the subsequent

Default Judgment, granted only some eight (8) days after the
Intervenor's. acquisition of Defendant Franich' s
real property interest.

remaining

Immediately upon discovering that
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delinquencies existed in the afore-referred to Contract, and
the existence of this lawsuit,

requests were made to the

Plaintiffs to reinstate and motions to join the lawsuit were
filed.

The motions were filed October 6,

1981,

thirteen

(13) days after the Default Judgment and between six (6) and
eleven

(11)

days after actual notice thereof.

Appellant

could have done nothing else to preserve his rights in a
more

timely manner.

Further,

his

actions

in a

timely

manner as described above, are not injured or made faulty by
any claimed constructive notice attributed to him as a
result of service upon the Defendant Franich, when Johnson
was his undisclosed partner.
notice,

his

timely

action,

Regardless of constructive
as

soon

as

he

had

actual

knowledge of the lawsuit entitles him to intervene.
issues

surrounding constructive notice

detail

in

herein.

Point

II,

which also

are

should be

discussed

The
in

incorporated

The Trial Court Judge erred in failing to apply

Rule 24(a) correctly and should be overturned by this Court.
POINT II. SETTING ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS ALLOWABLE FOR AN
INTERVENOR, WHO HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTION, TOOK TIMELY ACTION
AFTER OBTAINING SAID PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE;
EVEN THOUGH OTHER DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE AND SOME OF THOSE DEFENDANTS
MAY HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATES, JOINT
VENTURERS, OR PARTNERS OF THE INTERVENOR.
Rule 60(b) (1), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
is and has been espoused by numerous

cases

to provide
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equitable relief from a Default Judgment to any defendant
that has proper grounds - - mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.
A person that fails to enter a defense to a lawsuit
that would materially

effect him,

neglects

his

duty.

However, if he fails to enter that appearance as a result of
his lack of knowledge,
excusable.

his neglect can be classified as

His timely action upon obtaining notice thereof,_

especially if within three months after the Judgment has
been entered, would qualify him for relief under the Rule.
Even if you contribute constructive notice to said person,
and with said constructive notice he fails to act, he may be
classified as

being

negligent.

If ,

however,

he

acts

immediately upon receiving actual notice, his action would
certainly fall within the doctrine of excusable neglect.

In

E.J. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Companv, 14 Utah 2d 52,
376 P2d 951

(1962)

the court found excusable neglect for

parties attempting to defend a corporation that had failed
to answer the suit even though proper service had been made
upon

the

President

of

the

corporation.

Al though

the

President had attempted to resign, he was a valid person to
serve for process on the corporation.

Therefore, service

was proper and notice was given to the corporation and
constructive

notice

to

the

officers,

shareholders of the corporation.

directors

and

However, the court felt

that where the shareholders were attempting to reorganize

-8-
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and moved with dispatch to set aside the Default Judgment,
excusable neglect was found.

Constructive notice did not

invalidate their neglect. The court goes on to state:
It is fundamental in our system of
justice that each party to a
controversy should be afforded an
opportunity to present his side of
the case.
For that reason it is
quite uniformly regarded as an abuse
of discretion to refuse to vacate a
Default Judgment where there is
reasonable justification or excuse
for the defendant's failure to appear,
and timely application is made to set
it aside. (Pg 952)
All of the shareholders in the above case had constructive
notice of the lawsuit.

They were still able to set aside

the Default Judgment and defend the action.
the

Intervenor,

Ronald

Johnson,

in

this

Even assuming
case

constructive notice by service of his partner

had

(Defendant

Joseph Franich), his timely action to set aside the Default
Judgment after receiving actual notice on the 30th day of
September,

1981,

should

be

allowable

under

excusable

neglect.
Filing a motion to set aside the Default Judgment on
October 6th, when notice was first actually received between
six

(6)

and eleven

(11)

days earlier, is timely.

the Motion was filed within thirteen
the Default Judgment.

(13)

Further,

days of granting

Appellant had no opportunity to act.

He was in a similar situation as the shareholders in
Mavhew.

E.J.

The E.J. Mayhew reasoning should also apply to the

question of Appellants opportunity and timely action
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to

intervene as discussed in Point I, hereof.

The failure of

the Trial Court Judge to see this is an abuse of his
discretion under Rule 60(b) and Rule 24.

If there was any

question, the question or doubt should be decided in favor
of

setting

it

aside.

Interstate

Development, 611 P2d 369

Excavating

v.

Ag la

(Ut.1980), Locke v. Peterson, 3

Utah 2d 415, 285 P2d 1111 (1955); Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah
354, 90 Pac.897

(1907); Heathman v. Fabian Clendenin, 14

Utah 2d 60, 377 P2d 189 (1962).

An additional factor that

needs to be considered is that because of the willingness of
the Appellant to assume all contract obligations as well as
his wilingness to pay all delinquencies, including costs and
attorney fees, the Plaintiffs are in a situation where their
rights are not injured or compromised by the setting aside
of the Default Judgment.
and one-half
it.

(2~)

Plaintiffs' Contract was only two

months delinquent, when they terminated

Appellant offered to

deficiencies.

also

correct other contract

If, however, the Default Judgment is not set

aside the Appellant loses valuable property rights with
little hope of recoupment.
The Trial Court Judge abused his discretion when he
denied Appellant's Motion to set aside the Default Judgment.
However, he may not have addressed this issue, feeling the
Appellant lacked standing when he denied his Motion to
Intervene.
POINT III. THE HARSH REMEDY OF FORFEITURE OF A

-10-
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, ENFORCED
BY DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN AN UNLAWFUL
DETAINER ACTION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
TO STAND; WHERE AN UNINFORMED PROPERTY
RIGHT CLAIMANT ACTS QUICKLY TO
(a) INTERVENE, (b) SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT AND (c) CURE ALL DELINQUENCIES
THEREIN.
The importance of the Trial Court's decision and
whether he abused his discretion,
type of lawsuit at issue -

is re-emphasized by the

an Unlawful Detainer action to

enforce the non judicial termination and forfeiture of a
Uniform Real Estate Contract.
both as

an undisclosed

Intervenor's rights accrued

joint venturer and as

an after

acquirer of Defendant's rights claimed through a Uniform
Real

Estate

Contract.

Without

actual

notice

to

the

Intervenor, even though done unknowing and without malice,
the Contract had been terminated and all property rights
returned to the Seller.

In Interstate Excavating v. Agla

Development, previously cited, the Court states as follows
in talking about a Default Judgment:
However, they are not favored
in the law, especially where a
party has timely responded with
challenging pleadings. When that
has been done some caution should
be observed to see that the party
is not taken advantage of.
Speaking
generally about such problems, it
is to be kept in mind that access
to the Courts =or the protection of
rights and the settlement of disputes
is one of the most important factors
in the maintenance of peacable and well
ordered society .... The uniformly acknowledged policy of the law is to accord
litigants the opportunity for a hearing
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on the merits, where that can be done
without serious injustice to the other
party . (Pg 3 71)
The Court has
Judgments.

long recognized the harshness of Default
The

Court

should

recognize

the

greater

harshness of default judgments, when the substance of the
case being supported by that Default Judgment will further
create

acknowledged harsh results. This situation should be

reviewed with the careful eye found in a trial rather than
summarily deduced by Default Judgments.
121 Ut.468,243 P2d 446

Perkins v. Spencer,

(1952).

CONCLUSION

The Lower Trial Court's orders should be reversed
and Ronald Johnson should be granted the right to intervene
and

file

responsive

Detainer action.

pleadings

to

Plaintiffs'

Unlawful

The Appellant had a right to intervene, as

an individual whose property rights were being adversely
affected by Plaintiffs'

suit.

He timely filed his Motion

for Intervention after acquiring said property rights and
actual notice of the lawsuit.

Now being a party of the

suit, he timely filed a Motion to set aside the previously
granted Default Judgment because he failed to have actual
notice of the lawsuit. His lack of actual knowledge under
the circumstances constituted excusable neglect recognizable
by the Rules of Procedures of the State of Utah.

-12-

Whereupon,
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)

the Appellant may openly defend and have litigated to the
scrutiny of the Trial Court Judge

the harsh remedy of

forfeiture and Unlawful Detainer requestjl by the Plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted this /£...'-(fay of February,
1982.

HUNT

LE
Attorney for Appellant
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